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INTRODUCTION 
My professional career has spanned three of the four eras of juvenile justice 
in the United States: the Due Process Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s; the Get 
Tough Era of the 1980s and 1990s; and the more recent academic and judicial 
recognition that Kids Are Different. I focused on juvenile justice administration 
when few legal scholars or criminologists appreciated that the intersection of 
youth policy and crime policy raised many interesting and challenging questions. 
I have had opportunities to work with professional organizations and law reform 
groups to promote policy reforms and learned from those who labor in the 
trenches about the practical problems they confront. Those collaborations have 
informed my research agenda and I have learned from them how to use academic 
research to influence policy and practice. 
A young scholar does not know the course of his or her career, where their 
research will lead, what its impact will be, or what intellectual themes will 
emerge. From the vantage point of a career spanning more than four decades and 
in retrospect, I can identify three themes in my scholarship: culpability, compe-
tence, and equality. For the juvenile court, culpability and competence implicate 
issues of ends and means, or substance and procedure.1 Substantive law defines 
                                                        
*  Centennial Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Minnesota Law School. B.A., Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania, 1966; J.D., University of Minnesota Law School, 1969; Ph.D., Harvard 
University (Sociology), 1973. I received outstanding research assistance from Carolyn Isaac, 
Class of 2016. 
1  BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS 118–19 (1999) [hereinafter FELD, BAD KIDS], cited in In re Jerrell 
C.J., 699 N.W.2d 110, 134 n.44 (Wis. 2005) (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring); Barry C. Feld, 
Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court, 69 MINN. L. REV. 
141, 142 (1984) [hereinafter Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice], cited in Commonwealth v. 
Brown, 26 A.3d 485, 496 n.7 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011), In re Welfare of D.S.S., 506 N.W.2d 650, 
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rights and duties or legal goals. Procedural law defines the process through which 
to achieve those entitlements or objectives. In the context of juvenile courts, the 
ends and means—substance and procedure—represent the goals of judicial in-
tervention and methods to achieve them. Culpability focuses on youths’ mental 
state at the time of the crime, criminal responsibility, and penal consequences. 
To what extent is a youth responsible for the consequences of his actions? To 
what degree is he or she at fault and their conduct blameworthy? Substantive 
goals raise issues of diversion, treatment, and punishment, reduced culpability or 
diminished responsibility, and appropriate interventions or deserved conse-
quences. Substantive questions arise when juvenile courts detain and sentence 
delinquents, transfer them to criminal court, and sentence them as adults. Why 
and how do we respond to youths’ criminal misconduct as we do? Recent ad-
vances in developmental psychology and neuroscience inform policies about ap-
propriate interventions, waiver to criminal court, and sentencing as adults. 
Competence involves the ability to do something successfully or efficiently. 
In the context of juvenile courts, it focuses on youths’ capacity to employ rights, 
ability to understand and participate in the legal process, and decision-making 
capacities. Procedural issues involve youths’ competence to stand trial, ability to 
waive or invoke Miranda rights, capacity to exercise their right to counsel, and 
right to obtain a jury trial. Can delinquents measure up to adult legal performance 
standards or do they require additional procedural safeguards to offset their de-
velopmental limitations? In light of juvenile courts’ procedural deficiencies and 
youths’ developmental limitations, how reliable are delinquency convictions? 
Questions of equality address issues of race and gender in juvenile justice 
administration. Black youths have always experienced a different justice system 
than white youths.2 During the second-half of the twentieth century the issue of 
race has had two distinct and contradictory influences on juvenile and criminal 
justice policy. During the 1950s and 1960s, the Supreme Court’s Due Process 
Revolution imposed national legal and equality norms on the recalcitrant South-
ern states, which still adhered to a segregated Jim Crow legal regime.3 Beginning 
in the 1970s, conservative Republican politicians pursued a Southern strategy to 
appeal to white voters’ racial animus: they used issues such as crime and welfare 
                                                        
653 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); see also ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, 
RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 69 (2008). 
2  See generally FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1; GEOFF K. WARD, THE BLACK CHILD-SAVERS 
(2012). 
3  MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2d ed. 
1994); LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 490 (2000); Barry 
C. Feld, Race and the Jurisprudence of Juvenile Justice: A Tale in Two Parts, 1950–2000, in 
OUR CHILDREN, THEIR CHILDREN 122, 129 (Darnell F. Hawkins & Kimberly Kempf-Leonard 
eds., 2005) [hereinafter Feld, Race and the Juvenile Jurisprudence]; Barry C. Feld, Race, Pol-
itics, and Juvenile Justice: The Warren Court and the Conservative “Backlash,” 87 MINN. L. 
REV. 1447, 1463–73 (2003) [hereinafter Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice], cited in 
United States v. Pena, 268 F. Supp. 2d 65, 66 n.1 (D. Mass. 2003); Barry C. Feld, The Politics 
of Race and Juvenile Justice: The “Due Process Revolution” and the Conservative Reaction, 
20 JUST. Q. 765, 765 (2003) [hereinafter Feld, The Politics of Race]. 
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as code-words for race to gain electoral advantage, and advocated get tough pol-
icies, which ultimately affected juvenile and criminal justice policies throughout 
the nation.4 The racialization of juvenile justice policy has led to a disproportion-
ate impact of punitive policies on minority youths, especially young black males. 
Historically, juvenile courts’ responses to girls have differed from their re-
sponses to boys.5 Industrialization brought more young women to cities and ex-
posed them to the hazards of prostitution and sexual exploitation.6 During the 
Progressive era, Victorian sensibilities and concerns about female sexuality en-
couraged regulation of girls for waywardness, incorrigibility, and sexual precoc-
ity.7 More recently, policy makers have recast girls’ acting-out behavior as vio-
lent conduct.8 Despite changes in practices over time—the different expectations 
and social construction of gender in different periods—the juvenile justice sys-
tem’s responses to girls have differed from those to boys.9 
As an institution, the juvenile court is situated at the nexus of two domains: 
youth policy and crime policy. How should society respond when the kid is a 
criminal and the criminal is a kid? Over the past century, two contending visions 
of youth have influenced policies toward young offenders. On the one hand, pol-
icy makers may characterize youths as children—immature, innocent, vulnerable 
and dependent. On the other hand, they may characterize them as quasi-adults—
mature and responsible. Despite the seeming contradiction between these polar 
characterizations, I argue that judges and legislators selectively choose between 
the two constructs—immature versus responsible—to maximize social control 
of young people. States treat juveniles like adults when formal equality results in 
practical inequality and use special juvenile court procedures when they provide 
an advantage to the state. These competing conceptions—immaturity and incom-
petence versus maturity and competence—affect legal responses to their mis-
deeds and strategies of social control.10 
Strategies of crime control mark the second idea shaping juvenile justice 
policy. When people violate the criminal law, legal scholars and criminologists 
typically differentiate between retributivist and utilitarian, or consequentialist, 
                                                        
4  Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice, supra note 3, at 1451. 
5  See generally STEVEN L. SCHLOSSMAN, LOVE AND THE AMERICAN DELINQUENT (1977); JOHN 
R. SUTTON, STUBBORN CHILDREN (1988); Barry C. Feld, Girls in the Juvenile Justice System, 
in THE DELINQUENT GIRL 225 (Margaret A. Zahn ed., 2009) [hereinafter Feld, Girls in the 
Juvenile Justice System]; Barry C. Feld, Violent Girls or Relabeled Status Offenders? An Al-
ternative Interpretation of the Data, 55 CRIME & DELINQ. 241 (2009) [hereinafter Feld, Violent 
Girls]. 
6  DAVID B. WOLCOTT, COPS AND KIDS 29, 40–41 (2005). 
7  Feld, Girls in the Juvenile Justice System, supra note 5. 
8  Id. at 227–36; Feld, Violent Girls, supra note 5, at 242. 
9  See generally Feld, Girls in the Juvenile Justice System, supra note 5; Feld, Violent Girls, 
supra note 5. 
10  See generally FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1; SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 1; Feld, Crim-
inalizing Juvenile Justice, supra note 1. 
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sanctions—deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation.11 Theories of punish-
ment reflect underlying assumptions about whether peoples’ behavior is deliber-
ately chosen or the product of antecedent forces—free will versus determinism. 
Juvenile courts’ historic claims to rehabilitate young offenders elicit the tradi-
tional dichotomy between treatment and punishment. Treatment-oriented inter-
ventions focus on offenders—what antecedent forces caused them to act as they 
did and what interventions can ameliorate those conditions, reform them, and 
improve their life chances. Punishment-oriented strategies focus on the offense 
committed and impose sanctions to denounce the act, alter the offender’s calcu-
lus, or reduce its likelihood of reoccurrence. The juvenile court’s founders rec-
ognized that children were not autonomous beings—they were more dependent 
on their families and communities than adults, they were less able to escape the 
criminogenic environments in which they lived, their behavior was more deter-
mined than chosen, and they should be treated rather than punished. 
Although Progressive reformers proffered rehabilitation as the primary jus-
tification for a separate juvenile court, diversion from the criminal process pro-
vided a second rationale at its inception and the court’s diversionary function still 
prevails. Regardless of juvenile courts’ ability to provide rehabilitative programs 
that improve children’s lives, simply deflecting youths from the criminal justice 
system avoids its more destructive consequences. Diversion constitutes a passive 
alternative to criminal courts that does less harm.12 Although juvenile courts then 
and now seldom achieve their rehabilitative goals, they still shield youths from 
life-altering criminal punishment and collateral consequences. The competing 
conceptions of childhood—immaturity and incompetence versus maturity and 
competence—and differing strategies of crime control—treatment or diversion 
versus punishment—affect the substantive goals and procedural means that ju-
venile courts use to regulate offending youths, and have varied throughout the 
history of the juvenile court, and among and within states. 
This article describes the trajectory of my career over the three eras of juve-
nile justice—the Due Process era, the Get Tough Era, and the contemporary re-
affirmation that Kids Are Different. Part I examines changes associated with the 
Supreme Court’s requirement that juvenile courts provide delinquents some pro-
cedural safeguards. Part II examines the Get Tough Era and states’ emphases on 
youths’ adult-like culpability and adoption of punitive policies. Part III reviews 
the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence of youth, reaffirmation that children 
are different, and limits on harsh punishment for youths. It concludes with a re-
flection on the limits of juvenile justice reform to improve the life chances of 
young people. 
                                                        
11  WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 3–4, 26–36 (5th ed. 2010). See generally MICHAEL 
TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 63–84 (2004). 
12  Franklin E. Zimring, The Common Thread: Diversion in Juvenile Justice, 88 CAL. L. REV. 
2477, 2483–84 (2000) [hereinafter Zimring, The Common Thread]; Franklin E. Zimring, The 
Common Thread: Diversion in the Jurisprudence of Juvenile Courts, in A CENTURY OF 
JUVENILE JUSTICE 142, 144–45 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002). 
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I.   THE DUE PROCESS REVOLUTION AND RETHINKING REHABILITATION 
On May 15, 1967, I was a first-year law student studying for final exams 
when the Supreme Court decided In re Gault13 and unbeknownst to me, changed 
my life. At that time, law schools did not offer courses on juvenile justice because 
prior to Gault there was no law of juvenile justice. Generic state statutes creating 
juvenile courts provided vague substantive goals—treatment and rehabilita-
tion—and minimal procedural limitations on judges’ discretion.14 Psychology, 
criminology, and sociology departments focused more on delinquency—why do 
adolescents commit crimes—than on justice administration—how states process 
young offenders. Schools of social work focused primarily on intervention and 
treatment of youths rather than juvenile justice administration. 
During the summer after my second year of law school in 1968, I worked 
for the General Counsel of the Office of Economic Opportunity (“OEO”) in 
Washington, D.C. Along with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, OEO reflected the country’s commitment to so-
cial, racial, and economic justice—a brief window when America waged a War 
on Poverty rather than its subsequent war on poor people.15 During the mid-
1960s, race riots rocked American cities as Blacks reacted violently to decades 
of segregation, deprivation, and alienation.16 “In 1964, a white police officer in 
Harlem shot and killed a fifteen-year-old black youth and set off the largest race 
riot since World War II.”17 The following summer, five days after President 
Johnson signed the 1965 Voting Rights Act, the Watts district of Los Angeles 
exploded in riot and television viewers watched Blacks battle police and loot 
stores.18 Thirty-eight riots in 1966 and 164 riots in 1967 raised fears of a national 
                                                        
13  In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
14  Roscoe Pound, Foreword to the First Edition of PAULINE V. YOUNG, SOCIAL TREATMENT 
IN PROBATION AND DELINQUENCY, at xv, xiv (2d ed. 1952) (arguing juvenile court judges 
should be exceptionally well-qualified—even while acknowledging they seldom were—be-
cause court procedures were so minimal and judicial discretion was so great. “The powers of 
the Star Chamber were a trifle in comparison with those of our juvenile courts and courts of 
domestic relations.”); Paul W. Tappan, Treatment Without Trial, 24 SOC. FORCES 306, 306, 
309 (1946) (criticizing juvenile courts as hybrid judicial case-work agencies, and condemning 
“informal, unofficial probation supervision or institutional remand before a hearing is held, 
and [] hearings in which there is no determination as to guilt of an offense, where personality 
factors and the ‘total situation’ determine adjudication.” Tappan objected that juvenile courts 
either presumed guilt or ignored proof of guilt and left complete discretion “in the hands of 
judicial and probation personnel unhampered by statutory definitions or limitations, undi-
rected save by a very general principle of treating, reforming, rehabilitating.”). 
15  See ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME 49–54 (2016). 
16  See POWE, supra note 3, at 274–76. 
17  Feld, Race and the Juvenile Jurisprudence, supra note 3, at 135. 
18  THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION 49–50 (1992); ANDREW 
HACKER, TWO NATIONS 25 (1992); REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL 
DISORDERS 203–06 (N.Y. Times ed. 1968). 
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race war.19 In 1968, the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. provoked an-
other spate of urban riots.20 President Lyndon Johnson established the National 
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders—the Kerner Commission—in re-
sponse to the riots.21 The Commission attributed the riots to the nation’s history 
of racial discrimination in employment, education, social services, and housing.22 
It warned that the country was moving “toward two societies, one black, one 
white—separate and unequal.”23 It cautioned that the historical legacy of segre-
gation and discrimination and continuation of current policies would “make per-
manent the division of our country into two societies: one, largely Negro and 
poor, located in the central cities; the other, predominantly white and affluent, 
located in the suburbs.”24 When I was a child in the 1950s, I attended segregated 
public schools in Washington, D.C. Coming of age in the 1960s heightened my 
awareness of issues regarding race, poverty, inequality, and crime. Despite the 
opportunity to pursue a conventional legal career, I decided instead to seek a 
graduate degree that would better enable me to address those issues. 
I did not read Gault until three years after it was decided, when I was a grad-
uate student working on a Ph.D. in sociology at Harvard University where I stud-
ied with Dr. Lloyd Ohlin.25 Dr. Ohlin was an architect of the War on Poverty and 
had recently concluded his role as associate director of the President’s Commis-
sion on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, which examined crim-
inal and juvenile justice administration against the backdrop of rising crime rates 
in the 1960s.26 Along with Professor James Vorenberg, who had served as Exec-
utive Director of the President’s Crime Commission, Dr. Ohlin ran the Harvard 
Law School Center for Criminal Justice.27 One of the Center’s major research 
projects was a study of changes in the Massachusetts Department of Youth Ser-
vices (“DYS”). In the early 1970s, Dr. Jerome Miller, Director of the Massachu-
setts Department of Youth Services, closed the training schools and replaced 
them with community-based services for most delinquent youths and with a few 
small, secure facilities for serious and violent youths.28 Under Ohlin’s direction, 
                                                        
19  NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE PROMISED LAND 190 (1992); REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY 
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, supra note 18; POWE, supra note 3, at 275–76. 
20  See LEMANN, supra note 19, at 191; POWE, supra note 3, at 275–76. 
21  See Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Forward to PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T & ADMIN. 
OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967). 
22  REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, supra note 18. 
23  Id. at 1.  
24  Id. at 22. 
25  See generally RICHARD A. CLOWARD & LLOYD E. OHLIN, DELINQUENCY AND OPPORTUNITY 
(1960). Lloyd Ohlin was one of the leading criminologists of his generation, and his research 
and writing provided the intellectual framework for the 1960s War on Poverty. 
26  See deB. Katzenbach, supra note 21. 
27  See id. 
28  See generally ROBERT B. COATES ET AL., DIVERSITY IN A YOUTH CORRECTIONAL SYSTEM 
(1978); BARRY C. FELD, NEUTRALIZING INMATE VIOLENCE (1977) [hereinafter FELD, 
NEUTRALIZING INMATE VIOLENCE]; JEROME G. MILLER, LAST ONE OVER THE WALL (1991). 
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I studied several different juvenile training schools and concluded that these in-
stitutions were youth prisons of dubious quality rather than the benign therapeu-
tic facilities that Progressive reformers promised.29 I lived in and studied the 
Massachusetts training schools for two years prior to their closing, and visited 
training schools in several other states. Based on my research and experience, I 
concluded that despite rehabilitative rhetoric and modest efforts to provide treat-
ment in institutions, these correctional facilities were custodial youth prisons 
whose primary virtue was that they were not as harmful or destructive as adult 
prisons and jails. Analysts described the closure of the training schools as “the 
most sweeping reforms in youth corrections in the United States since the estab-
lishment of juvenile reformatories in the 19th century and juvenile courts in the 
20th century.”30 
The 1970s were a decade of great intellectual ferment and change for those 
who studied criminal and juvenile justice administration.31 In 1971, the Ameri-
can Friends Service Committee published Struggle for Justice, which provided a 
left-wing critique of the prevailing ideology of rehabilitative treatment, individ-
ualized discretion, and indeterminate sentencing.32 In 1972, Marvin Wolfgang 
published his seminal Delinquency in a Birth Cohort, which identified different 
patterns of delinquency among youths and provided impetus for subsequent dec-
ades of research on criminal careers.33 The finding that a small-subset of chronic 
offenders accounted for most of the serious delinquency within the cohort offered 
an intellectual rationale for selective incapacitation sentencing policies. In 1974, 
Robert Martinson published What Works?, which critically analyzed correctional 
treatment programs’ efficacy, questioned their theoretical and scientific bases, 
and concluded that “[w]ith few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts 
that have been reported so far have had no appreciable effect on recidivism.”34 
Martinson’s conclusion undermined the rehabilitative foundation of the juvenile 
court and fostered pessimism about the efficacy of treatment among practitioners 
and criminologists that lasted for decades. In 1976, Andrew von Hirsch published 
Doing Justice and he and other scholars advocated retributive sentencing princi-
ples—just deserts—as an alternative to the then-prevailing rehabilitative 
model.35 Cumulatively, this research shifted the legal and criminological para-
digm from rehabilitation to retribution, from an emphasis on offenders to one 
focused on offenses. 
                                                        
29  FELD, NEUTRALIZING INMATE VIOLENCE, supra note 28, at 131–38. 
30  JAMES C. HOWELL, PREVENTING AND REDUCING JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 200 (2003). 
31  See generally DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL (2001). 
32  See generally AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE (1971). 
33  See generally MARVIN E. WOLFGANG ET AL., DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT (1972). 
34  Robert Martinson, What Works?—Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 PUB. 
INT. 22, 25 (1974). 
35  ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE 49–55 (1976); see also DAVID FOGEL, “. . . WE ARE 
THE LIVING PROOF . . .” 260–66 (2d ed. 1979); TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON 
CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT 11–14 (1976). 
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By the 1970s, Supreme Court decisions and the initial successes of The Civil 
Rights Movement supported a broader egalitarian ethos as women, gays and les-
bians, and other social movements used similar strategies and rhetoric in pursuit 
of equality.36 Advocates of “children’s liberation” challenged the social construc-
tion of childhood dependency and proposed greater legal and political equality 
with adults.37 In the mid-1970s, the American Bar Association (“ABA”) and In-
stitute of Judicial Administration sponsored the Juvenile Justice Standards Pro-
ject, which published twenty-three volumes of standards and commentary relat-
ing to every aspect of the juvenile justice system.38 The ABA standards 
responded to the Supreme Court’s due process decisions, eschewed juvenile 
courts’ parens patriae ideology and rehabilitative ideal, and endorsed a just de-
serts framework of determinate and proportional sanctions for delinquents and 
procedural parity with adults, including mandatory appointment of counsel and 
the right to a jury trial.39 I was co-reporter of the volume Rights of Minors, which 
examined “whether and to what extent a minor should be treated as an adult.”40 
Although the legal rights of minors vary with the issue and context—e.g., intra-
family disputes, access to medical treatments and abortion, contracts, employ-
ment, and the like—I approached the inquiry with a presumption of legal equality 
between children and adults, and examined to what extent children differ and 
require special legal protections. It provided my first foray into the developmen-
tal differences between adolescents and their elders that should inform youth 
policy. 
I joined the University of Minnesota Law School faculty in 1972 and taught 
criminal law, criminal procedure, and juvenile justice. While on leave from 
teaching in 1974 and 1978, I worked as an assistant county prosecutor in the 
criminal trial division and in the juvenile court division. The contrast between 
the procedural safeguards afforded to adult criminal defendants and those given 
to delinquents made a profound impression. In criminal felony cases, I tried cases 
in open court in front of a jury with zealous public defenders in a newly con-
structed county government center. By contrast, I prosecuted delinquents in 
“King Arthur’s Court”41—a judicial fiefdom dominated by one judge who had 
presided for several decades and who conducted informal proceedings in a dark 
renovated courthouse that had previously served as the county morgue. The sub-
stantial differences between the legal procedures, the quality of personnel, and 
the outcomes in the two systems strongly affected my critical views of the pro-
cedural deficiencies of juvenile justice. 
                                                        
36  Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice, supra note 3, at 1496–97. 
37  See generally RICHARD FARSON, BIRTHRIGHTS (1974); JOHN HOLT, ESCAPE FROM 
CHILDHOOD (1974). 
38  See, e.g., INST. OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. & AM. BAR ASS’N, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, at v–
ix (1980). 
39  See generally id. 
40  Id. at 2. 
41  See, e.g., CHARLES E. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 345–46 (1978). 
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My first book, Neutralizing Inmate Violence: Juvenile Offenders in Institu-
tions, emerged from my research in Massachusetts and comparatively evaluated 
ten different correctional programs in the training schools.42 In the mid-1970s, 
the Minnesota Commissioner of Corrections convened a Serious Juvenile Of-
fender Committee to consider whether the state should construct a secure facility 
to treat serious young offenders—in those days, primarily chronic burglars and 
car thieves. The Committee concluded that youths who required long-term se-
cure confinement needed more robust procedural safeguards than juvenile courts 
provided, and thus should be transferred to criminal court. I wrote a legislative 
position paper for the Commissioner of Corrections that morphed into my first 
article on waiving juveniles to criminal court, Reference of Juvenile Offenders 
for Adult Prosecution.43 In 1978, transfer of youths to criminal court was a rela-
tively minor policy issue that had received minimal attention from legal scholars 
or criminologists. Written against the backdrop of intellectual and criminological 
changes in the 1970s, I argued that the statutory criteria—amenability to treat-
ment and dangerousness—raised some of the most fundamental substantive is-
sues of juvenile justice.44 Is anyone amenable to treatment? If so, are there clini-
cal tools with which to validly distinguish amenable from non-amenable youths? 
Can clinicians or judges accurately predict a youth’s future dangerousness? I ar-
gued that the uncertain efficacy of juvenile interventions and the inherent sub-
jectivity of clinical discretion led to inconsistent outcomes and racial and geo-
graphic disparities in waiver decisions. Drawing on principles of just deserts and 
selective incapacitation, I proposed that the legislature should use various com-
binations of present offense and prior records—seriousness and persistence—as 
criteria to exclude older youths from juvenile court jurisdiction rather than to rely 
on amorphous judicial assessments of their amenability or predictions of danger-
ousness.45 
                                                        
42  See generally FELD, NEUTRALIZING INMATE VIOLENCE, supra note 28. 
43  Barry C. Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders for Adult Prosecution: The Legislative Al-
ternative to Asking Unanswerable Questions, 62 MINN. L. REV. 515 (1978) [hereinafter Feld, 
Reference of Juvenile Offenders], cited in Deel v. Jago, 967 F.2d 1079, 1090 (6th Cir. 1992), 
State v. Behl, 564 N.W.2d 560, 568 (Minn. 1997), In re K.G., 295 N.W.2d 323, 326 n.4 (N.D. 
1980), Hidalgo, Jr. v. State, 983 S.W.2d 746, 754 n.15 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999), Oklahoma ex 
rel. Coates v. Johnson, 597 P.2d. 328, 333 n.10 (Okl. Crim. App. 1979) (Cornish, J. concur-
ring). 
44  See generally id. at 526–46. 
45  Id. at 572–78. I have subsequently recanted my support for exclusive reliance on offense 
criteria and concluded that “a judicial hearing conducted in juvenile court, guided by relatively 
objective substantive offense criteria and subject to rigorous appellate review, probably con-
stitutes the least bad solution to the intractable sentencing problems posed by serious young 
offenders.” Barry C. Feld, Legislative Exclusion of Offenses from Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: 
A History and Critique, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 83, 127–28 (Jeffrey 
Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000) [hereinafter Feld, Legislative Exclusion of Offenses]. 
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In 1979, the Minnesota Supreme Court in In re Dahl extensively quoted my 
criticism of the waiver criteria and invited the legislature to provide clearer stand-
ards.46 
Unfortunately, the standards for referral adopted by present legislation are not 
very effective in making this important determination. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . Due to these difficulties in making the waiver decision, many juvenile 
court judges have tended to be overcautious, resulting in the referral of delinquent 
children for criminal prosecution on the erroneous, albeit good faith, belief that 
the juveniles pose a danger to the public. Accordingly, a reevaluation of the ex-
isting certification process may be in order.47 
Other courts have relied on my critique of the prediction literature and the 
limits of judicial and clinical prognostication to invalidate judges’ flawed spec-
ulation about future dangerousness.48 The 1980 Minnesota legislature responded 
                                                        
46  In re Dahl, 278 N.W.2d 316, 318–19 (Minn. 1979). 
47  Id. The Court relied heavily on my analysis of the problem: 
     “Like the quest to determine who may be amenable to treatment, efforts to identify the currently 
or potentially dangerous have entailed social science research as well as judicial inquiry. The ir-
resistible conclusion of this research is that identification of the dangerous ‘presupposes a capacity 
to predict future criminal behavior quite beyond our present technical ability.’ 
     “In this regard, one of the leading scholars on the prediction of dangerousness concludes that 
[t]he ability to predict which juvenile will engage in violent crime, either as adolescents or as 
adults, is very poor.  
“ ‘The conclusion of Wenk and his colleagues that “there has been no successful attempt to iden-
tify, within . . . offender groups, a subclass whose members have a greater than even chance of 
engaging again in an assaultive act” is as true for juveniles as it is for adults. It holds regardless of 
how well trained the person making the prediction is—or how well programmed the computer—
and how much information on the individual is provided. More money or more resources will not 
help. Our crystal balls are simply very murky, and no one knows how they can be polished.’ ” 
Id. (quoting Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supra note 43, at 541). The Court went on 
to substantially quote my critique of the waiver criteria: 
“. . . Thus, ‘[t]he conclusion to emerge most strikingly from these studies is the great degree to 
which violence is overpredicted . . . Of those predicted to be dangerous, between 65 percent and 
99 percent are false positives—that is, people who will not, in fact, commit a dangerous act . . . 
Violence is vastly overpredicted whether simple behavioral indicators are used or sophisticated 
multivariate analyses are employed and whether psychological tests are administered or thorough 
psychiatric examinations are performed.’ 
     “The tendency to overpredict dangerousness raises profound moral questions with which soci-
ety must deal in its treatment of both juvenile and adult offenders. In the context of assessing 
dangerousness for purposes of parole release, for example, how many false positives—people who 
would not offend again if released—are we willing to continue to incarcerate in order to ensure 
that those relatively few but unidentifiable individuals who actually would offend are not released? 
To what extent are we willing to permit judicial speculation about future violence in the waiver 
context if to do so means that large numbers of juvenile ‘false positives’ may be prosecuted as 
adults?” 
Id. at 319 (quoting Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supra note 43, at 542) (alteration in 
original). 
48  See, e.g., Deel, 967 F.2d at 1090 (citing Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supra note 
43, at 566–71, in a discussion of low recidivism rates of delinquents); United States ex rel. 
Martin v. Strasburg, 513 F. Supp. 691, 711 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (citing Feld, Reference of Juvenile 
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to the Court’s invitation in Dahl.49 It amended the juvenile code purpose clause 
to emphasize the “integrity of [] substantive criminal law” and used present of-
fense/prior record criteria to create a presumption for waiver, but ultimately re-
tained the traditional discretionary approach to judicial waiver.50 In a subsequent 
article, Dismantling the Rehabilitative Ideal, I responded to the statutory 
changes, criticized the legislature’s presumptive waiver strategy, and argued that 
it would not limit judicial discretion.51 Minnesota courts relied heavily on my 
                                                        
Offenders, supra note 43, at 543, for a description of what is involved in statistical prediction); 
Id. at 709 n.31 (“In view of the uncertainties and inconsistencies typically associated with 
social science research, the clear-cut superiority of actuarial methods over clinical methods is 
startling.” (quoting Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supra note 43, at 543)); United 
States v. J.D., 525 F. Supp. 101, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (“It therefore seems to evince a com-
mitment to what has been called the ‘rehabilitative ideal,’ which underlay the creation of the 
juvenile justice system, and which has as its premise ‘a societal consensus that youthful law 
violators should be treated differently from adult offenders because juveniles are both less 
responsible for their delicts and more responsive to nonpunitive intervention.” (quoting Feld, 
Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supra note 43, at 516)); State v. Buelow, 587 A.2d 948, 955 
(Vt. 1990) (“[B]ecause judicial waiver statutes typically give judges broad discretion in mak-
ing transfer decisions, such statutes invite abuse of discretion and discriminatory application, 
thus undermining the fairness of the judicial process.” (quoting Feld, Reference of Juvenile 
Offenders, supra note 43, at 520)); Behl, 564 N.W.2d at 568 (citing Feld, Reference of Juvenile 
Offenders, supra note 43, at 563–64, for a discussion of automatic classification of juveniles); 
In re K.G., 295 N.W.2d at 326 n.4; State v. D.W.C., 256 S.E.2d 894, 898 (W. Va. 1979) (citing 
Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supra note 43, at 614, for the idea that “the transfer 
decision should be keyed to the particular background of the individual” with the emphasis on 
consideration of a juvenile’s prior record); Hidalgo, Jr., 983 S.W.2d at 754 n.15; In re J.L.B., 
435 N.W.2d 595, 603 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); Johnson, 597 P.2d at 333 n.10 (summarizing the 
discussion of, and suggestion for, a rational predictive basis for certification found in Feld, 
Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supra note 43). 
49  MINN. STAT. § 260.125 (1980) (current version at MINN. STAT. § 260B.125 (2016)); Barry 
C. Feld, Juvenile Court Legislative Reform and the Serious Young Offender: Dismantling the 
“Rehabilitative Ideal,” 65 MINN. L. REV. 167, 192–97 (1980) [hereinafter Feld, Juvenile Court 
Legislative Reform]. 
50  Feld, Juvenile Court Legislative Reform, supra note 49, at 192–97, cited in State v. McFee, 
721 N.W.2d 607, 613 (Minn. 2006), In re K.C., 513 N.W.2d 18, 22 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994). 
51  See generally Feld, Juvenile Court Legislative Reform, supra note 49. 
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critical analyses of the new statute to decide subsequent waiver cases.52 Empiri-
cal and legal analyses and criticism of waiver statutes, policies, and practices 
became one staple of my scholarship over the next three decades.53 
In 1979, the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission promulgated 
and in 1980, Minnesota adopted determinate sentencing guidelines (“Guide-
lines”).54 The Guidelines reflected a “modified just deserts” framework and com-
bined retributive just deserts policies with selective incapacitation based on prior 
                                                        
52  See, e.g., McFee, 721 N.W.2d at 613 (“This legislation reflects ‘a fundamental philosophical 
departure from the previous rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile justice system to much more 
explicitly punitive and social control purposes.’ ” (quoting Feld, Juvenile Court Legislative 
Reform, supra note 49, at 192)); In re D.F.B., 433 N.W.2d 79, 80–81 (Minn. 1988) (discussing 
the change in attitude toward juveniles the 1980 amendment reflected); In re K.A.A, 410 
N.W.2d 836, 840 n.7 (Minn. 1987); In re J.F.K., 316 N.W.2d 563, 564 (Minn. 1982); In re 
Givens, 307 N.W.2d 489, 490 n.1 (Minn. 1981); People v. Peterson, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 318, 321 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (citing Feld, Juvenile Court Legislative Reform, supra note 49, at 233, 
237, to show contrast between the Minnesota and California juvenile systems); In re K.C., 513 
N.W.2d at 22 (“Professor Feld cogently asserts that the ‘particular cruelty’ standard is ‘an 
inherently vague grant of discretion,’ comparing its language to that of death penalty statutes 
struck down by the United States Supreme Court.” (quoting Feld, Juvenile Court Legislative 
Reform, supra note 49, at 220)); In re T.L.J., 495 N.W.2d 237, 240 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (“A 
leading commentator on juvenile law asserts that the prima facie case shifts only the burden 
of production, not the burden of persuasion.” (citing Feld, Juvenile Court Legislative Reform, 
supra note 49, at 215)); In re J.L.B., 435 N.W.2d at 601 (citing Feld, Juvenile Court Legislative 
Reform, supra note 49, at 206, in discussion of the policy ramifications of the 1980 amend-
ment); In re D.F.B., 430 N.W.2d 475, 478 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Little, 423 N.W.2d 
722, 724 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (citing Feld, Juvenile Court Legislative Reform, supra note 
49, at 233, to refute one of Little’s arguments); In re S.R.L., 400 N.W.2d 382, 384 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1987); In re D.S.F., 416 N.W.2d 772, 776 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). 
53  See generally, e.g., BARRY C. FELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 
ADMINISTRATION 523 – 713 (4th ed. 2013) [hereinafter FELD, JUVENILE JUSTICE 
ADMINISTRATION];; Barry C. Feld, Bad Law Makes Hard Cases: Reflections on Teen-Aged 
Axe-Murderers, Judicial Activism, and Legislative Default, 8 L. & INEQ. 1 (1989) [hereinafter 
Feld, Bad Law]; Barry C. Feld, Delinquent Careers and Criminal Policy: Just Deserts and the 
Waiver Decision, 21 CRIMINOLOGY 195 (1983) [hereinafter Feld, Delinquent Careers]; Feld, 
Legislative Exclusion of Offenses, supra note 45; Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the 
Principle of the Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 471 (1987) [hereinafter Feld, Juvenile Waiver Statutes], cited in Deel, 967 F.2d 
at 1089; Marcy R. Podkopacz & Barry C. Feld, Judicial Waiver Policy and Practice: Persis-
tence, Seriousness and Race, 14 L. & INEQ. 73 (1995); Marcy R. Podkopacz & Barry C. Feld, 
The Back-Door to Prison: Waiver Reform, “Blended Sentencing,” and the Law of Unintended 
Consequences, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 997 (2001) [hereinafter Podkopacz & Feld, The 
Back-Door to Prison]; Marcy R. Podkopacz & Barry C. Feld, The End of the Line: An Empir-
ical Study of Judicial Waiver, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 449 (1996) [hereinafter Pod-
kopacz & Feld, The End of the Line]. 
54  Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, 1978–2003, in CRIME AND JUSTICE 
131, 131 (Michael Tonry ed., Vol. 32, 2005) [hereinafter Frase, Sentencing Guidelines]. See 
generally, Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Policy and Criminal Justice in Minnesota: Past, Pre-
sent, and Future, COUNCIL ON CRIME & JUST. (Jan. 14, 2015) [hereinafter Frase, Sentencing 
Policy], https://web.archive.org/web/20150114224505/http://www.crimeandjustice.org/coun-
cilinfo.cfm?pID=52 [https://perma.cc/W8Q8-LCQB]. 
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record.55 Under the Guidelines, judges imposed presumptive sentences based on 
combinations of present offense seriousness and prior record.56 On the Guide-
lines’ grid, an offender’s prior criminal history score and seriousness of the pre-
sent offense determined whether or not a judge would sentence an offender to 
prison and for how long.57 In testimony prior to the Guidelines’ promulgation, I 
presented the Commission with the emerging research on delinquent and crimi-
nal careers and persuaded it to include some juvenile prior convictions as part of 
adults’ criminal history score.58 The Guidelines included felony convictions of 
youths sixteen and seventeen years of age.59 Unlike adult convictions, it took two 
juvenile felony convictions to equal one point in the criminal history score.60 The 
Commission gave more limited effect to prior delinquency adjudications than it 
did to adult convictions because of concerns about the procedural inadequacies 
of juvenile courts. 
Although Minnesota’s juvenile courts adopted county rules of procedure in 
the aftermath of Gault, it was not until 1983 that the Minnesota Supreme Court 
promulgated its first set of statewide, uniform rules of procedure.61 In 1984, I 
published a 135-page law review article—Criminalizing Juvenile Justice—in 
which I systematically compared and contrasted the Court’s rules of procedure 
for juvenile court with those of adult criminal procedure.62 My critique of the 
juvenile court rules developed the thesis that 
in every instance in which the Minnesota Supreme Court had the opportunity to 
provide juveniles with greater procedural safeguards than those afforded adult 
criminal defendants and to recognize the special characteristics of youth, the court 
chose not to furnish the safeguards but to treat juveniles just like adult criminal 
defendants. Conversely, in every instance in which the court had an opportunity 
to treat juveniles at least as well procedurally as adult criminal defendants, it 
adopted juvenile court procedures with less effective safeguards.63 
                                                        
55  Frase, Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 54, at 133. See generally Feld, Delinquent Ca-
reers, supra note 53; Frase, Sentencing Policy, supra note 54. 
56  See generally Richard S. Frase, Implementing Commission-Based Sentencing Guidelines: 
The Lessons of the First Ten Years in Minnesota, 2 CORNELL J. L. PUB. POL’Y 279 (1993); 
Richard S. Frase, Purposes of Punishment Under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, 13 
CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 11 (1994); Frase, Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 54; Frase, Sentencing 
Policy, supra note 54. 
57  MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES COMM’N, MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND 
COMMENTARY § 4.A, at 79 (2016). 
58  See generally Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice, supra note 3. 
59  Frase, Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 54, at 165. 
60  See id. 
61  Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice, supra note 1, at 165. 
62  See generally id. 
63  Id. at 168; see also State v. Burrell, 697 N.W.2d 579, 593 n.4 (Minn. 2005) (citing Feld, 
Criminalizing Juvenile Justice, supra note 1, at 177–80, for “noting that Georgia, Indiana, 
Louisiana, and Pennsylvania are among states that have experimented with per se rules and 
that a few other states equate a juvenile’s request for a parent with a request for an attorney.”); 
People v. Hana, 504 N.W.2d 166, 170 n.24, 171 n.32, 180 (Mich. 1993) (“The waiver of ju-
venile court jurisdiction is ‘a sentencing decision that represents a choice between the punitive 
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In short, the Court’s rules treated juveniles just like adults when formal 
equality resulted in practical inequality and used special juvenile court proce-
dures when they provided an advantage for the state. For example, the Court used 
the adult legal standard—“knowing, intelligent, and voluntary [] under the total-
ity of the circumstances”64—to gauge juveniles’ waivers of Miranda rights and 
the right to counsel at trial even though youths’ developmental limitations in-
creased the likelihood of improvident decisions. Conversely, the Court denied 
delinquents the right to a public and jury trial that adults enjoy and thereby made 
it easier to convict delinquents than to convict adult criminal defendants based 
on the same evidence.65 
While writing Criminalizing Juvenile Justice, I realized that the standard that 
courts use to gauge juveniles’ waivers of Miranda rights applied to waivers of 
the right to counsel at trial as well. Filling in some footnotes on juveniles’ waiv-
ers of counsel, I discovered there was almost no research about rates of represen-
tation, delivery of legal services, and the impact of lawyers in juvenile courts.66 
In the mid-1980s, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 
sponsored a Visiting Scholar residency at the National Center for Juvenile Justice 
where I collected and analyzed the available data on juveniles’ access to and the 
impact of counsel in delinquency proceedings. In a series of articles and a book, 
                                                        
disposition of adult criminal court and the ‘rehabilitative’ disposition of the juvenile court.’ ” 
(citing Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice, supra note 1, at 269)); McIntyre v. State, 526 
A.2d 30, 40 (Md. 1987) (citing Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice, supra note 1, for 
“rais[ing] serious doubts about juveniles’ intellectual and psychological capabilities to com-
prehend constitutional rights”); Commonwealth v. Brown, 26 A.3d 485, 495–96 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2011) (“First, the minority view disregards the practical results of a juvenile transfer hear-
ing, which has been described by one commentator as ‘a sentencing decision that represents a 
choice between the punitive disposition of adult criminal court and the ‘rehabilitative’ dispo-
sition of the juvenile court.’ ” (quoting Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice, supra note 1, at 
269)); In re D.S.S., 506 N.W.2d 650, 653 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (“Some scholars suggest, 
however, that a juvenile’s right to counsel may have little meaning because juveniles do not 
fully understand their procedural rights.” (citing Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice, supra 
note 1, at 174–75)); In re Robert M., 576 A.2d 549, 551 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990); In re D.S.F., 
416 N.W.2d 772, 776 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (citing Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice, su-
pra note 1, at 168–69, 275, for “suggesting that abolition of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction 
over criminal and noncriminal misconduct may be desirable, based on observation that chil-
dren in juvenile court face a punitive system and at the same time are denied fundamental 
procedural benefits of jury trials and a secure right to counsel.”); In re D.A.H., 360 N.W.2d 
676, 678 n.1 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (discussing Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice, supra 
note 1, at 243–66, for commentary on juries in juvenile cases); In re L.K.W., 372 N.W.2d 392, 
402 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (citing Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice, supra note 1, for a 
discussion of modern juvenile justice debates); In re J.P.L., 359 N.W.2d 622, 625 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1984) (“Combining the suppression hearing with the trial on the merits is . . . a highly 
prejudicial practice that increases the likelihood of erroneous determinations of guilt.” (quot-
ing Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice, supra note 1, at 273)). 
64  Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice, supra note 1, at 169 (quotations omitted). 
65  See id. at 243–66. 
66  Id. at 189–90 nn.160–63. 
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Justice for Children: The Right to Counsel and Juvenile Courts,67 I reported that 
in three of the six states that reported data on rates of representation, the majority 
of juveniles appeared in juvenile courts without a lawyer.68 I also reported that 
youth represented by counsel received more severe sentences than did those 
without counsel—i.e., lawyers are an aggravating factor in sentencing.69 I prof-
fered three hypotheses to explain the perverse finding that lawyers increased a 
delinquent’s likelihood of receiving a more severe, out-of-home placement than 
unrepresented youths. First, I hypothesized that juvenile defense lawyers were 
incompetent and prejudiced their clients’ outcomes.70 Second, I conjectured that 
juvenile court judges prejudged cases and assigned counsel when they anticipate 
more severe dispositions, although they still incarcerated many unrepresented 
youths.71 Third, I suggested that judges punished youths who insisted on formal 
procedures (or gave leniency to those who “thr[ew] themselves on the mercy of 
the court”).72 I likened the presence of counsel in juvenile courts to the “trial 
penalty” that adult criminal defendants pay for not pleading guilty.73 Finally, I 
reported that rates of representation varied substantially in urban, suburban, and 
rural juvenile courts within a state and resulted in “justice by geography.”74 So-
cial structure and context strongly influenced the administration of justice.75 For 
example, judges adjudicated the majority of youths in the rural counties without 
a lawyer present because the youths had waived counsel.76 I identified a relation-
ship between procedural formality and sentencing severity. Controlling for other 
variables, judges sentenced youths tried in more formal courts more severely 
than did those tried in procedurally informal courts.77 
                                                        
67  See, e.g., BARRY C. FELD, JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN (1993) [hereinafter FELD, JUSTICE FOR 
CHILDREN]. 
68  Barry C. Feld, In re Gault Revisited: A Cross-State Comparison of the Right to Counsel in 
Juvenile Court, 34 CRIME & DELINQ. 393, 393 (1988); see also FELD, JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN, 
supra note 67, at 54–55; Barry C. Feld, Justice by Geography: Urban, Suburban, and Rural 
Variations in Juvenile Justice Administration, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 156, 206–10 
(1991) [hereinafter Feld, Justice by Geography]; Barry C. Feld, The Right to Counsel in Juve-
nile Court: An Empirical Study of When Lawyers Appear and the Difference They Make, 79 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1185, 1221 (1989) [hereinafter Feld, Right to Counsel], cited in 
United States v. Farhad, 190 F.3d 1097, 1107 n.2 (9th Cir. 1999) (Reinhardt, J., concurring), 
In re J.A.J., 545 N.W.2d 412, 417 n.5 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (Crippen, J., concurring). 
69  See FELD, JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN, supra note 67, at 98–106; Feld, Right to Counsel, supra 
note 68, at 1330–34. 
70  Feld, Right to Counsel, supra note 68, at 1330–31. 
71  Id. at 1332–33. 
72  Id. at 1333–34. 
73  See generally id. See also Barry C. Feld & Shelly Schaefer, The Right to Counsel in Juvenile 
Court: The Conundrum of Attorneys as an Aggravating Factor at Disposition, 27 JUST. Q. 
713, 718 (2010) [hereinafter Feld & Schaefer, Conundrum of Attorneys]. 
74  See Feld, Right to Counsel, supra note 68, at 1318–22; see also Feld, Justice by Geography, 
supra note 68, at 206–10. 
75  Feld, Justice by Geography, supra note 68, at 160–62. 
76  See id. at 185–86. 
77  Id. at 198–206. 
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When I published this research, it garnered media attention and provided 
impetus for the Minnesota Supreme Court to create a study commission on Legal 
Representation of Juveniles.78 The committee recommended mandatory appoint-
ment of counsel or stand-by counsel for all delinquents.79 However, different 
counties funded their public defender systems from different budgets—courts, 
prosecution, or defense—and the committee could not estimate either the costs 
of the current legal services delivery systems or estimate what it would cost to 
provide a full representation system.80 As a result, the legislature did not act.81 
Subsequent replications of my research on delivery of legal services by law-
yers and criminologists in other jurisdictions have strongly corroborated my find-
ings that many, if not most, delinquents do not receive assistance of counsel, that 
lawyers are an aggravating factor in sentencing, and that geographic context 
strongly influences justice administration.82 After law reform efforts in Minne-
sota in the mid-1990s to improve delivery of legal services in juvenile courts, I 
conducted pre- and post-implementation studies. While Minnesota made some 
progress in providing counsel for delinquents, those same findings—attorneys as 
an aggravating factor in sentencing and justice by geography—still prevailed a 
decade later.83 
                                                        
78  See MINN. SUPREME CT. TASK FORCE, RACIAL BIAS IN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM 108 (1993); 
Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law Reform, 
79 MINN. L. REV. 965, 987–88 (1995) [hereinafter Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy]. See 
generally, e.g., Patricia Lopez Baden, Legislature OKs Juvenile Crime Bill; Violent Youths 
Could Get Adult Penalties, STAR TRIB., Apr. 30, 1994, at 1B; Kevin Diaz, Juvenile Justice 
System Takes Verbal Beating, STAR TRIB., Mar. 26, 1993, at 1B; Mike Kaszuba, Juvenile-
Code Revision Appears in Trouble, STAR TRIB., Feb. 20, 1986, at 1B; Mike Kaszuba, Revised 
Juvenile Code Passed by Senate Panel, STAR TRIB., Feb. 18, 1986, at 2B; Sam Newlund, Ju-
venile Code Reform Moves in Legislature After Fine-Tuning, STAR TRIB., Feb. 11, 1986, at 1B; 
Dane Smith, DFLers Target Crime Committed by Juveniles in New Crime Package, STAR 
TRIB., Dec. 1, 1993, at 1B. 
79  Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy, supra note 78, at 994. 
80  Id. at 994–95. 
81  Id. at 995. 
82  See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-95-139, JUVENILE JUSTICE: 
REPRESENTATION RATES VARIED AS DID COUNSEL’S IMPACT ON COURT OUTCOMES 13, 15, 24 
(1995); Timothy M. Bray et al., “Justice by Geography”: Racial Disparity and Juvenile 
Courts, in OUR CHILDREN, THEIR CHILDREN 270, 270–272 (Darnell F. Hawkins & Kimberly 
Kempf-Leonard eds., 2005); George W. Burruss, Jr. & Kimberly Kempf-Leonard, The Ques-
tionable Advantage of Defense Counsel in Juvenile Court, 19 JUST. Q. 37, 48–55 (2002); Lori 
Guevara et al., Race, Gender, and Legal Counsel: Differential Outcomes in Two Juvenile 
Courts, 6 YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 83, 83–84 (2008); Lori Guevara et al., Race, Legal 
Representation, and Juvenile Justice: Issues and Concerns, 50 CRIME & DELINQ. 344, 344–47 
(2004); State Assessments, NJDC, http://njdc.info/our-work/juvenile-indigent-defense-assess-
ments/ [https://perma.cc/AM53-4FSP] (last visited Jan. 3, 2017). 
83  Feld & Schaefer, Conundrum of Attorneys, supra note 73, at 731–37; Barry C. Feld & 
Shelly Schaefer, The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court: Law Reform to Deliver Legal Ser-
vices and Reduce Justice by Geography, 9 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 327, 347–51 (2010) 
[hereinafter Feld & Schaefer, Law Reform to Deliver Legal Services]. 
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In 1992, Congress reauthorized the Juvenile Justice Delinquency Prevention 
Act (“OJJDP”) and added a provision on “Access to Justice” to improve the de-
livery of legal services.84 In addition to my own statement and testimony, several 
witnesses who appeared before Congress referred to my research on inadequate 
representation of youths in delinquency proceedings to bolster the case for add-
ing the amendment on access to justice.85 The OJJDP reauthorization funded re-
search by the General Accounting Office (“GAO”) to replicate my findings.86 
The GAO report confirmed that juvenile courts in several states adjudicated 
many unrepresented delinquents and that justice administration varied with geo-
graphic context.87 The OJJDP reauthorization also provided funds to the Ameri-
can Bar Association (“ABA”) to improve access to and quality of lawyers in 
juvenile courts.88 The ABA published A Call for Justice, which decried the inad-
equate delivery and poor quality of legal services in juvenile courts.89 Over the 
past two decades, the ABA and subsequently the National Juvenile Defender 
Center have conducted in-depth assessments of the delivery of legal services and 
performance of counsel in juvenile courts in twenty-one states.90 Those reports 
consistently document the inadequate resources and poor quality of justice af-
forded to delinquents.91 
The inadequate quality of procedural justice and poor performance of coun-
sel reflected, in part, most law schools’ failure to provide courses or clinics on 
juvenile justice. The curricular deficiency mirrored law faculties’ disinterest in 
the field. Although a few law professors published juvenile justice casebooks in 
the 1970s and 1980s,92 by the 1990s those books were out of print or out of date. 
The absence of off-the-shelf teaching materials deterred many faculty who were 
                                                        
84  Act of Nov. 4, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-586, § 2(g)(6)(b)(5)(B), 106 Stat. 4982, 4998–99 
(mandating a study of juvenile access to counsel and submission of recommendations for im-
proving access to counsel); Juvenile Justice in America, Focusing on the Status of the Juvenile 
Court System: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Juvenile Justice of the Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 102d Cong. 163, 165 (1992) (statement of Barry C. Feld, Ph.D., University of Minnesota 
Law School) [hereinafter Juvenile Justice in America]. 
85  See, e.g., Juvenile Justice in America, supra note 84, at 6 (statement of Hon. Frank Orlando 
(ret.), Nova University). 
86  U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 82, at 13. 
87  See id. at 15. 
88  AM. BAR ASS’N JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. ET AL., A CALL FOR JUSTICE 4 (1995) [hereinafter A 
CALL FOR JUSTICE]; Am. Bar Ass’n Presidential Working Grp., America’s Children at Risk: A 
National Agenda for Legal Action, 27 FAM. L.Q. 433, 446 (1993). 
89  A CALL FOR JUSTICE, supra note 88. 
90  State Assessments, supra note 82. 
91  See id. 
92  See generally, e.g., SANFORD J. FOX, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN JUVENILE JUSTICE 
(2d ed. 1981); SANFORD J. FOX, THE LAW OF JUVENILE COURTS IN A NUTSHELL (2d ed. 1977); 
FRANCIS B. MCCARTHY ET AL., JUVENILE LAW AND ITS PROCESSES (2d ed. 1989); FRANK W. 
MILLER ET AL., THE JUVENILE JUSTICE PROCESS (3d. 1985). 
17 NEV.L.J. 299, FELD - FINAL.DOCX 4/5/17  11:01 AM 
316 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:299  
not juvenile justice specialists from offering courses. I published Cases and Ma-
terials on Juvenile Justice Administration93 and Juvenile Justice Administration 
in a Nutshell94 as a service to the field to enable more law schools to offer courses 
and to train future lawyers to represent children. I received the American Bar 
Association’s Livingston Hall Award for my career-long efforts to improve de-
livery and quality of legal services in juvenile courts.95 
II.   THE GET TOUGH ERA 
In the mid-1980s, I sensed the increasingly punitive directions of juvenile 
justice policies. I assessed whether the retributive just deserts sentencing poli-
cies, which increasingly dominated the criminal justice system, were spilling 
over into the juvenile justice system as well. In two of my most cited law review 
articles, I examined states’ adoption of offense criteria to govern waiver deci-
sions and juvenile court sentencing practices. In The Juvenile Court Meets the 
Principle of Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference It Makes, I sur-
veyed states’ increased use of offense criteria to govern juvenile judges’ sentenc-
ing decisions—determinate and mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, parole 
release and corrections guidelines, and empirical evaluations of sentencing prac-
tices.96 Even before we fully appreciated the impact of get tough policies, I ar-
gued that juvenile courts’ sentencing practices were becoming increasingly pu-
nitive and elevating offense factors over consideration of the offender.97 The 
pronounced shift from treatment to punishment eroded justifications to provide 
delinquents with fewer procedural safeguards than adult criminal defendants re-
ceived.98 
In The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Legislative Changes 
in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, I surveyed when and how states amended their 
waiver statutes to use offense criteria—legislative offense exclusion and prose-
                                                        
93  See generally BARRY C. FELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 
ADMINISTRATION (2000). This book is now in its fourth edition, which was published in 2013. 
94  See generally BARRY C. FELD, JUVENILE JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION IN A NUTSHELL (3d ed. 
2014). Professor Weijian Gao translated the second edition of the NUTSHELL into Chinese, 
which was published in 2011. 
95  Livingston Hall Juvenile Justice Award, AM. B. ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/ 
criminal_justice/awards/hall.html [https://perma.cc/3QJ5-6SWM] (last visited Dec. 28, 2016). 
96  See Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment, Treat-
ment, and the Difference It Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 838–50 (1988) [hereinafter Feld, Ju-
venile Court Meets the Principle of Offense]; see also United States v. Johnson, 28 F.3d 151, 
160 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (relying on Feld, Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense, supra, 
at 849–50 tbl.1, in discussing the wide discretion exercised by juvenile court judges); In re 
Richard A., 946 A.2d 204, 210 (R.I. 2008) (relying on Feld, Juvenile Court Meets the Principle 
of Offense, supra, at 824–25, in discussing the different goals of the adult and juvenile criminal 
justice systems). 
97  See Feld, Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense, supra note 96, at 850–79. 
98  See id. at 902–15. 
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cutorial direct file—to reduce judicial discretion and to emphasize the serious-
ness of the offense over considerations of the offender.99 Again, the timing and 
direction of change strongly indicated an increasingly punitive stance toward se-
rious young offenders.100 
By the early-1990s, Minnesota and the nation were deep in the throes of the 
Get Tough Era. Rising youth crime rates and murders committed with guns 
prompted punitive legislative responses.101 Gun and gang violence led the media 
to describe Minnesota’s largest city as “Murderopolis.”102 After a juvenile court 
judge declined to waive a sixteen-year-old youth who axe-murdered four mem-
bers of his family for criminal prosecution, a public and legislative outcry en-
sued.103 In reaction, the Minnesota Supreme Court, Governor, and Legislature 
created a commission—the Juvenile Justice Task Force—to recommend proce-
dural and substantive changes in Minnesota’s waiver law and many other aspects 
of juvenile justice administration.104 
                                                        
99  See Feld, Juvenile Waiver Statutes, supra note 53, at 503–19; see also Deel v. Jago, 967 
F.2d 1079, 1089 (6th Cir. 1992) (discussing Ohio’s waiver criteria); People v. Hana, 504 
N.W.2d 166, 169 n.21 (Mich. 1993); In re A.L., 638 A.2d 814, 817 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1994) (citing Feld, Juvenile Waiver Statutes, supra note 53, at 471, in a general overview of 
judicial waiver); In re J.L.B., 435 N.W.2d 595, 603 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). 
100  See Feld, Juvenile Waiver Statutes, supra note 53, at 517. 
101  Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy, supra note 78, at 975–82. 
102  An Oversight Hearing on Reduced Federal Funding For Law Enforcement and the Rise in 
Violent Crime: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Democratic Policy, 190th Cong. 2 (July 10, 
2006) (statement of Timothy Dolan, Chief of Police, Minn. Police Dpt.). See generally, e.g., 
Kevin Diaz, Family, Friends Shocked that Man Slain for Bicycle, STAR TRIB., Oct. 7, 1993, at 
1B; Conrad deFiebre, 15-Year-Old Fired Shots, 3 Others Say—Two Clerks Were on Floor in 
Store, Charges Allege, STAR TRIB., June 10, 1992, at 1B; Tatsha Robertson, Police Arrest 
Three Suspects in Shooting at Mall of America, STAR TRIB., Feb. 25, 1993, at 1B; James Walsh 
& Bill McAuliffe, Man, 3 Juveniles Held in St. Paul Slayings—2 Store Clerks Killed During 
Holdup, STAR TRIB., June 9, 1992, at 1A. 
103  Feld, Bad Law, supra note 53, at 73. The juvenile court judge found sixteen-year-old David 
Brom “amenable to treatment.” In re D.F.B., 430 N.W.2d 475, 480 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988). He 
was a B+ student with no prior record and no previous treatment exposure, but was suffering 
from clinical depression. Id. at 480–81. The judge’s decision provoked a public and political 
outcry. See Tom Krattenmaker, The Rochester Ax Murders, STAR TRIB., July 17, 1988, Sunday 
Magazine, at 12; Bill McAuliffe, Court Rules Brom Should Be Tried as Adult in Ax Murders, 
STAR TRIB., Oct. 18, 1988, at 1A. The Minnesota court of appeals, In re D.F.B., 430 N.W.2d 
at 483, and the Supreme Court, In re D.F.B., 433 N.W.2d 79 (Minn. 1988), reversed the 
judge’s decision, emphasized the seriousness of his crimes, and ordered him tried as an adult. 
My article provided a case study of the types of evidence judges consider in judicial waiver 
hearings, as well as an empirical evaluation of waiver practices throughout the state. It again 
identified the role of “justice by geography” in judges’ waiver decisions. Despite appellate 
court decisions to the contrary, I argued that the juvenile court judge’s decision to retain juris-
diction over the youth was the correct result given the statutory criteria. I used the article to 
reiterate my earlier criticism of the law, and to tell the legislature “I told you so”—the earlier 
amendments would not control judicial discretion. See Feld, Juvenile Court Legislative Re-
form, supra note 49. 
104  Minnesota Supreme Court Advisory Task Force on the Juvenile Justice System: Final Re-
port, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 595, 597–98 (1994); see also Feld, Violent Youth and Public 
Policy, supra note 78, at 997–98. 
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I served on the Task Force, which met for two years, brought in juvenile 
justice consultants and experts, collected data on current practices, held public 
hearings, and conducted focus group meetings with justice system stakeholders. 
The Task Force recommended a comprehensive package of procedural and sub-
stantive reforms that the legislature unanimously enacted that fostered a conver-
gence between juvenile and criminal courts.105 Based on my Task Force experi-
ences, I wrote Youth Violence and Public Policy as a case study of the process 
of law reform and to provide a legislative history for courts interpreting the stat-
ute.106 The new law used offense criteria, such as those I had proposed in 1978 
in Reference of Juvenile Offenders, to create a presumption to waive serious of-
fenders to criminal courts.107 It included blended sentencing provisions—Ex-
tended Jurisdiction Juvenile Prosecution (“EJJ”)—to provide a longer delin-
quency sentence in lieu of waiver to criminal court for the “less bad of the 
worst.”108 It expanded the use of delinquency convictions to enhance adult crim-
inal sentences.109 It mandated appointment of counsel or stand-by counsel for 
youths charged with a felony and those who faced out-of-home placement.110 
I then served as co-reporter for the Minnesota Supreme Court to write rules 
of juvenile court procedure to implement the far-reaching statutory changes.111 
Despite efforts to write clear and strong rules, my subsequent evaluations of sev-
eral provisions of the new law questioned whether the reforms accomplished 
what the legislature intended.112 For example, the blended-sentencing provision, 
which the legislature intended to provide an alternative to waiver, instead had a 
net-widening effect that resulted in more youths in prison. Judges continued to 
transfer the same numbers and types of youths whom they waived previously 
                                                        
105  See Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy, supra note 78, at 1121–28. 
106  See generally id. This piece has garnered judicial attention. See State ex rel. D.J., 817 So. 
2d 26, 29 (La. 2002) (citing Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy, supra note 78, in review 
of the juvenile justice system); In re C.B., 708 So. 2d 391, 395 (La. 1998); State v. Behl, 564 
N.W.2d 560, 571 n.1 (Minn. 1997); State ex rel. C.F., No. 2007-C-0027, 2007 WL 7712768, 
*4 (La. Ct. App. 4 Cir. Feb. 12, 2007); In re C.D.N., 559 N.W.2d 431, 434 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1997) (citing Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy, supra note 78, for the importance of ju-
venile access to juries); State v. Robert K. McL., 496 S.E.2d 887, 891 n.4 (W. Va. 1997) 
(discussing Feld’s change in attitude towards automatic waiver in Violent Youth and Public 
Policy, supra note 78, at 151); In re L.B.K., No. C8-95-2504, 1996 WL 250563, *1 (Minn. 
Ct. App. May 14, 1996) (citing Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy, supra note 78, in dis-
cussing the Minnesota Juvenile Justice Task Force and recommendations). 
107  See Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supra note 43; Feld, Violent Youth and Public 
Policy, supra note 78, at 1024–37. 
108  Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy, supra note 78, at 1038–50. 
109  Id. at 1057–67.  
110  Id. at 1108–21. 
111  MINN. SUPREME CT. ADVISORY COMM., THE MINNESOTA RULES OF JUVENILE PROCEDURE: 
FINAL REPORT (1995). 
112  See generally Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice, supra note 1; Feld & Schaefer, Conun-
drum of Attorneys, supra note 73; Feld & Schaefer, Law Reform to Deliver Legal Services, 
supra note 83; Podkopacz & Feld, The Back-Door to Prison, supra note 53; Podkopacz & 
Feld, The End of the Line, supra note 53. 
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and used the blended sentencing provisions to impose longer sentences on youths 
whom they previously sentenced as ordinary delinquents.113 As a result of pro-
bation revocations of delinquency sanctions, the numbers of youths going to 
prison through the back-door nearly doubled.114 Similarly, although the statute 
and court rules clearly mandated appointment of counsel for all youths charged 
with felonies, rates of representation changed only modestly, the adverse effect 
of lawyers on delinquents’ sentences actually increased, justice by geography 
remained, and judges still removed unrepresented youths from their homes.115 
I wrote my multi-prize winning book Bad Kids: Race and the Transfor-
mation of the Juvenile Court in the late-1990s during the height of the Get Tough 
Era.116 As a due process liberal, it reflected my despair over the punitiveness of 
delinquency sanctions, the denial of basic procedural safeguards, and the dispro-
portionate impact of those harsh policies on minority youth. It addressed three 
questions. First, what has happened to the juvenile court? It answered that it has 
been transformed from a nominally rehabilitative welfare agency into a scaled-
down, second-class criminal court that provides neither therapy nor justice. Se-
cond, Bad Kids asked how this transformation has occurred. It answered that the 
public and policy makers have two competing cultural and legal conceptions of 
youth people—as vulnerable and dependent versus responsible and almost adult-
like—and judges and legislators selectively choose between these alternative for-
mulations to maximize social control of young people.117 At the end of the twen-
tieth century, get tough lawmakers primarily emphasized youths’ “adultness”—
e.g., “old enough to do the crime, old enough to do the time.”118 Finally, Bad 
Kids asked why this transformation has occurred. It answered that the racial and 
structural transformation of American cities that accompanied the Great Migra-
tion of Blacks from the rural South to the urban North fueled the politics of race 
and crime and encouraged conservative politicians to use coded appeals to 
Whites’ racial animus to crack down on youth crime.119  
During the 1950s and 1960s, social structural changes, which began several 
decades earlier, impelled the Supreme Court to reexamine criminal and juvenile 
justice practices because of concerns about racial discrimination and civil 
                                                        
113  See Podkopacz & Feld, The Back-Door to Prison, supra note 53, at 1062–65. 
114  See id. at 1057–62. 
115  See generally Feld & Schaefer, Law Reform to Deliver Legal Services, supra note 83; 
Podkopacz & Feld, The Back-Door to Prison, supra note 53. 
116  FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1; see also Past Award Recipients, ACJS, 
http://www.acjs.org/page/Past_Awards [https://perma.cc/YZF8-PX3P] (noting Barry C. Feld 
as the 2001 Outstanding Book Award recipient) (last visited Dec. 28, 2016); ASC Award Win-
ners, ASC, https://www.asc41.com/awards/awardWinners.html [https://perma.cc/U76R-
XZVG] (noting Barry C. Feld as the 2002 recipient of the Michael J. Hindelang Book Award) 
(last visited Dec. 28, 2016). 
117  See FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1, at 107–08. 
118  See id. at 189–208, 239. 
119  See id. at 79–81. 
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rights.120 The Great Migration increased the urbanization of Blacks and the pro-
portion living outside of the South, and forced Congress and the Court to address  
racial inequality and denial of civil rights.121 The Warren Court’s school deseg-
regation, criminal procedure, and juvenile justice due process decisions reflected 
a broader shift in constitutional jurisprudence to protect individual rights and the 
civil rights of racial minorities.122 
The second period of juvenile justice policy changes emerged in response to 
Gault’s formalization of juvenile court procedures in 1967 and culminated in the 
get tough legislation of the late-1980s and early-1990s.123 Although protecting 
minorities’ liberty interests provided the impetus for the Warren Court’s focus 
on constitutional safeguards, granting delinquents some procedural protections 
precipitated the transformation of the juvenile court into a wholly-owned subsid-
iary of the criminal justice system and legitimated the imposition of punitive 
sanctions that fell disproportionately heavily on minority offenders.124 In the 
1970s, many industries closed with massive job losses, especially among less 
skilled workers.125 In the 1980s, crack cocaine and gun violence had a devastat-
ing impact on the inner cities reeling from deindustrialization.126 Conservative 
politicians manipulated and exploited public fears to wage a succession of Wars 
on Crime, on Drugs, and subsequently on Youths.127 They enacted harsh and pu-
nitive changes to juvenile and criminal laws that disproportionately affected 
black residents of the inner cities already disadvantaged by job loss, segregation, 
poverty, and social isolation.128 
In Bad Kids, I proposed to abolish juvenile courts, to try young offenders in 
criminal courts with enhanced procedural safeguards, to develop a separate sen-
tencing system—a Youth Discount—that formally recognized youthfulness as a 
mitigating factor, and to provide young offenders with resources and room to 
reform.129 Many of those ideas reflect Scandinavian countries’ responses to 
young offenders, which deals with younger children exclusively through their 
child welfare system and with older adolescent offenders in modified criminal 
courts, which give judges the option to commit youths to the child welfare system 
                                                        
120  Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice, supra note 3, at 1450–51. 
121  Id. at 1462–67. 
122  See id. at 1468–70, 1474–79. 
123  See id. at 1480–94. 
124  See id. at 1493–94. 
125  See id. at 1508–12. 
126  See id. at 1517–23. 
127  See generally id. at 1538–52. 
128  In several post-Bad Kids articles, I develop more fully the themes of the politics of race. 
See generally, e.g., Feld, Race and the Juvenile Jurisprudence, supra note 3; Feld, Race, Pol-
itics, and Juvenile Justice, supra note 3; Feld, The Politics of Race, supra note 3; Barry C. 
Feld, Unmitigated Punishment: Adolescent Criminal Responsibility and LWOP Sentences, 10 
J. L. & FAM. STUD. 11 (2007) [hereinafter Feld, Unmitigated Punishment]. 
129  FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1, at 327–30. 
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or to impose mitigated punishment in the adult system.130 In the two decades 
since I wrote Bad Kids, I have realized that the politics of crime and race in the 
United States could not produce the type of social welfare or justice systems that 
serve the children of Norway, Denmark, or Sweden. Equally importantly, we 
have learned much more about adolescent developmental psychology and neu-
roscience and why policies to protect children in the United States require a sep-
arate juvenile justice system. 
 
III.   RECOGNIZING THAT CHILDREN ARE DIFFERENT 
In response to the punitive excesses of get tough politicians, the John D. and 
Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation funded a Network on Adolescent Develop-
ment and Juvenile Justice (“Network”).131 From 1995 to 2005, the Network con-
ducted research on adolescent developmental psychology and neuroscience.132 
The research centered on changes in youths’ thinking and behavior to provide an 
evidence-based rationale for juvenile justice policy.133 It centered on three broad 
themes: adolescents’ competence to exercise legal rights; youths’ criminal cul-
pability and deserved punishment; and their treatment responsiveness and poten-
tial for change.134 In addition to numerous articles and books by individual mem-
bers, the Network published three books focused on adolescent competence, 
culpability, and racial disparities in juvenile justice administration, to each of 
which I contributed a chapter.135 
The research on culpability focused on how youths’ immature judgment—
risk perception, time frame, and appreciation of consequences—impulsivity, and 
limited self-control distinguished them from adults and rendered their bad 
choices categorically less blameworthy.136 A trilogy of Supreme Court decisions 
                                                        
130  See generally Barry C. Feld, Juvenile Justice Swedish Style: A Rose By Another Name?, 
11 JUST. Q. 625 (1994); Carl-Gunnar Janson, Youth Justice in Sweden, in 31 YOUTH CRIME 
AND YOUTH JUSTICE 391 (Michael Tonry & Anthony N. Doob eds., 2004); Britta Kyvsgaard, 
Youth Justice in Denmark, in 31 YOUTH CRIME AND YOUTH JUSTICE, supra, at 349. 
131  About Us, MACARTHUR FOUND., https://www.macfound.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/HF3 
K-SZKD] (last visited Dec. 28, 2016). 
132  See Juvenile Justice, MACARTHUR FOUND., https://www.macfound.org/programs/juve-
nile_justice/strategy/ [https://perma.cc/NPP2-DKZJ] (last visited Dec. 28, 2016). 
133  See generally, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, REFORMING 
JUVENILE JUSTICE (2013); SCOTT & STEINBERG, surpra note 1; Bringing Research to Practice 
in the Juvenile Justice System, MACARTHUR FOUND. RES. NETWORK: ADOLESCENT DEV. & 
JUV. JUST., http://www.adjj.org [https://perma.cc/PF52-PFAD] (last visited Dec. 28, 2016). 
134  See Juvenile Justice, supra note 132. 
135  See generally Barry C. Feld, Juveniles’ Waiver of Legal Rights: Confessions, Miranda, and 
the Right to Counsel, in YOUTH ON TRIAL 105 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 
2000); Feld, Legislative Exclusion of Offenses, supra note 45; Feld, Race and the Juvenile 
Jurisprudence, supra note 3. 
136  Barry C. Feld, The Youth Discount: Old Enough to Do the Crime, Too Young to Do the 
Time, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 107, 114–20 (2013) [hereinafter Feld, The Youth Discount] (re-
viewing research on developmental psychology and neuroscience). 
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that limited states’ authority to impose the same punishments on children as 
adults reflected the Justices’ appreciation of youths’ diminished criminal respon-
sibility and reduced culpability. Roper v. Simmons categorically prohibited states 
from executing youths for crimes committed as juveniles.137 Graham v. Florida 
categorically prohibited states from imposing life without parole sentences on 
youths convicted of non-homicide offenses.138 Miller v. Alabama prohibited 
mandatory life without parole sentences for youths who commit murder.139 In all 
three cases, the Court emphasized that immaturity, impulsivity, susceptibility to 
peer influence, and transitory personality development warranted less severe sen-
tences for juveniles than those imposed on adults.140 The Court’s jurisprudence 
of youth echoed arguments I have made for more than a quarter-century for a 
Youth Discount—a categorical use of age as a proxy for reduced culpability and 
shorter sentences based on diminished responsibility.141 
The MacArthur Foundation’s research on competence focused on youths’ 
ability to understand and exercise legal rights such as Miranda and counsel, and 
whether they possessed the minimum proficiency required to stand trial.142 The 
Court’s jurisprudence of youth in J.D.B. v. North Carolina reflected its appreci-
ation of juveniles’ developmental differences from those of adults.143 Miranda 
held that if police question a suspect who is in custody, they must administer the 
cautionary warning and J.D.B. posed the issue “whether the Miranda custody 
analysis includes consideration of a juvenile suspect’s age.”144 The Court con-
cluded that age was an objective factor that affected how a person would feel 
                                                        
137  See generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
138  See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 109 (2010) (citing Feld, Unmitigated Punishment, 
supra note 128, at 69–70, for its comment on juvenile life without parole sentences). 
139  See generally Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
140  See generally Feld, The Youth Discount, supra note 136. 
141  See generally FELD, BAD KIDS, supra note 1, at 315–21; Barry C. Feld, A Slower Form of 
Death: Implications of Roper v. Simons for Juveniles Sentenced to Life Without Parole, 22 
NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 9 (2008), cited in State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 62 
(Iowa 2013), State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 877 n.4 (Iowa 2009); Barry C. Feld, Abolish 
the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. 
LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 68, 121–33 (1997); Barry C. Feld, The Constitutional Tension Between 
Apprendi and McKeiver: Sentence Enhancements Based on Delinquency Convictions and the 
Quality of Justice in Juvenile Courts, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1111 (2003) [hereinafter Feld, 
The Constitutional Tension Between Apprendi and McKeiver], cited in Welch v. United 
States, 604 F.3d 408, 432 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J., dissenting), Gonzales v. Tafoya, 515 
F.3d 1097, 1111 (10th Cir. 2008), Jones v. Roberts, No. 06-3100-SAC, 2006 WL 2989237, at 
*5 (D. Kan. Oct. 19, 2006), In re Jonathon C.B., 958 N.E.2d 227, 269 (Ill. 2011), Bruegger, 
773 N.W.2d at 870–71 n.1, State v. Brown, 879 So. 2d 1276, 1282 (La. 2004), State v. Hand, 
No. 25840, 2014 WL 4384131, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2014), People v. Mazzoni, 165 
P.3d 719, 722 (Colo. App. 2006); Feld, Juvenile Waiver Statutes, supra note 53, at 520–28. 
142  See generally Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison 
of Adolescents’ and Adults’ Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333 
(2003). 
143  See generally J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261 (2011). 
144  Id. at 268. 
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restrained.145 “[O]fficers and judges need no imaginative powers, knowledge of 
developmental psychology, training in cognitive science, or expertise in social 
and cultural anthropology to account for a child’s age. They simply need the 
common sense to know that a 7-year-old is not a 13-year-old and neither is an 
adult.”146 The MacArthur research documented a sharp decline in youths’ adju-
dicative competence, ability to understand rights, or capacity to participate in the 
legal system by those fifteen-years of age or younger.147 
For the past decade, my research has focused again on youths’ competence 
to exercise legal rights or to make a “knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver” 
of Miranda rights and the right to counsel. In the mid-2000s, I conducted pre-
liminary research in one county on youths’ competence to exercise Miranda 
rights.148 Subsequently, in Kids, Cops, and Confessions, I expanded that research 
                                                        
145  Id. at 271–72; see also BARRY C. FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS 41–42 (2013) [here-
inafter FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS]. 
146  J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 279–80. 
147  See FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 145, at 46–59; Grisso et al., supra 
note 142, at 356. 
148  Two articles I wrote discussing this research have garnered judicial attention. See generally 
Barry C. Feld, Juveniles’ Competence to Exercise Miranda Rights: An Empirical Study of Pol-
icy and Practice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 26 (2006) [hereinafter Feld, Juveniles’ Competence to 
Exercise Miranda Rights], cited in In re S.W., 124 A.3d 89, 112 n.16 (D.C. 2015) (“To sum-
marize, developmental psychological research assessing several domains of legal and adjudi-
cative competence consistently indicates that adolescents as a class are at a significant disad-
vantage in the interrogation room . . . compared with adults. For youths fifteen years of age 
and younger, these disabilities emerge clearly in the research.” (quoting Feld, Juveniles’ Com-
petence to Exercise Miranda Rights, supra, at 57–58)), In re H.V., 252 S.W.3d 319, 335 (Tex. 
2008) (citing Feld, Juveniles’ Competence to Exercise Miranda Rights, supra, at 99, for the 
assertion that children fifteen and under often do not understand Miranda warnings), In re 
Andrew, 895 N.E.2d 166, 171 (Ohio 2008) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Feld, Juveniles’ 
Competence to Exercise Miranda Rights, supra, at 99, for the proposition that children over 
sixteen understand Miranda to the same extent as adults), In re J.T.M., 441 S.W.3d 455, 468 
(Tex. App. 2014) (Rodriguez, J., dissenting); Barry C. Feld, Police Interrogation of Juveniles: 
An Empirical Study of Policy and Practice, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 219 (2006) [here-
inafter Feld, Police Interrogation of Juveniles], cited in In re Miah S., 861 N.W.2d 406, 414 
n.26 (Neb. 2015), State v. Moore, 864 N.W.2d 827, 851 n.10 (Wis. 2015) (Abrahamson, C.J., 
dissenting) (“Police complete nearly all interrogations of juveniles and adults in less than one 
or two hours. By contrast, they extract the vast majority of false confessions only after inter-
rogating suspects for six hours or longer.” (quoting Feld, Police Interrogation of Juveniles, 
supra, at 308)), State ex rel. A.W., 51 A.3d 793, 799 n.3 (N.J. 2012) (citing Feld, Police In-
terrogation of Juveniles, supra, at 236–37, in discussing the Reid method), Reza v. State, 163 
So. 3d 572, 578–79 n.6 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (citing Feld, Police Interrogation of Juve-
niles, supra, in asserting that juveniles are particularly susceptible to unfair police interroga-
tions due to immaturity and vulnerability), In re Elias V., 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 202, 215 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2015) (“Confronting innocent people with false evidence—laboratory reports, finger-
prints or footprints, eyewitness identification, failed polygraph tests—may cause them to dis-
believe their own innocence or to confess falsely because they believe that police possess 
overwhelming evidence. Innocent suspects may succumb to despair and confess to escape the 
rigors of interrogation in the naïve belief that later investigation will establish their innocence 
rather than seek to confirm their guilt.” (quoting Feld, Police Interrogation of Juveniles, supra, 
at 313)). 
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to four counties—two urban, two suburban.149 Kids, Cops, and Confessions is 
only the second empirical study of what happens in the interrogation room since 
Miranda and the first to examine how the police question older delinquents 
charged with felonies.150 Although developmental psychologists doubt youths’ 
competence to exercise Miranda rights, the law equates juveniles with adults and 
police interrogate them just like adults.151 I concluded that police are trained to 
question suspects one way and they interrogate all suspects—adults and juve-
niles, blacks and whites, boys and girls—using the same protocol.152 
As juvenile courts became more formal and punitive, I have questioned 
whether their procedural safeguards can assure the validity and reliability of de-
linquency adjudications. In In re Winship, the Court required states to prove de-
linquency—a criminal violation—“beyond a reasonable doubt,” rather than by 
lower civil standards of proof.153 However, in 1971, a plurality of the Court in 
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania denied delinquents a constitutional right to a jury 
trial.154 McKeiver assumed that delinquents received treatment rather than pun-
ishment, although the Court did not review any factual record to support that 
assumption.155 Rather, the Court simply asserted that juvenile courts are not crim-
inal courts.156 Regardless of the validity of McKeiver’s reasoning then, subse-
quent decades of get tough legislative amendments have clearly eroded juvenile 
                                                        
149  See FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 145, at 51–54. In 2015, the Academy 
of Criminal Justice Sciences gave Kids, Cops, and Confessions its Outstanding Book Award. 
Past Award Recipients, supra note 116. 
150  See generally Barry C. Feld, Behind Closed Doors: What Really Happens When Cops 
Question Kids, 23 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 395 (2013); Barry C. Feld, Cops and Kids in 
the Interrogation Room, in INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING 35 (Ray Bull ed., 2014); Barry C. 
Feld, Real Interrogation: What Actually Happens When Cops Question Kids, 47 L. & SOC’Y 
REV. 1 (2013) [hereinafter Feld, Real Interrogation]; Barry C. Feld, Questioning Gender: Po-
lice Interrogation of Delinquent Girls, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1059 (2014) [hereinafter 
Feld, Questioning Gender]. 
151  See Feld, Real Interrogation, supra note 150, at 5; Feld, Questioning Gender, supra note 
150, at 1063. 
152  See FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 145, at 226–27; Feld, Questioning 
Gender, supra note 150, at 1099. 
153  In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970); Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice, supra note 
1, at 157. 
154  See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); see also Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile 
Justice, supra note 1, at 160; Feld, The Constitutional Tension Between Apprendi and 
McKeiver, supra note 141, at 1111. 
155  See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 547; Feld, The Constitutional Tension Between Apprendi and 
McKeiver, supra note 141, at 1149–50. See generally Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice, 
supra note 1; Feld, Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense, supra note 96 (arguing that 
legislative purpose clauses, sentencing statutes, judges’ sentencing practices, conditions of 
confinement, and treatment outcomes provide indicators of whether juvenile court interven-
tions are for treatment or punishment). 
156  McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 541, 545 (arguing that juvenile courts are not criminal courts within 
the meaning of the sixth and fourteenth amendments). 
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courts’ rehabilitative foundation.157 The inferior quality of justice in juvenile 
courts is even more problematic when states use delinquency adjudications to 
enhance subsequent adult criminal sentences and to impose other collateral con-
sequences. 
Apprendi v. New Jersey ruled that “any fact that increases the penalty for a 
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, other than the fact of a prior 
conviction, must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”158 The Court reasoned that a jury, rather than a judge at a sentencing 
hearing, must find any facts on which a trial court based an enhanced sentence.159 
The Court exempted the fact of a prior conviction because criminal defendants 
enjoyed the right to a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt when the 
state obtained the prior conviction.160 Apprendi emphasized the jury’s role to find 
facts, to uphold Winship’s standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and to 
assure the validity and reliability of convictions.161 Because of the procedural 
differences between juvenile and criminal courts, federal and state courts are 
sharply divided over whether Apprendi allows judges to use delinquency convic-
tions obtained without access to a jury to enhance criminal sentences.162 While 
                                                        
157  See generally Barry C. Feld, A Century of Juvenile Justice: A Work in Progress or a Rev-
olution That Failed?, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 189 (2007). 
158  Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 465, 466 (2000) (emphasis added). 
159  Id. at 499–501; see also Feld, The Constitutional Tension Between Apprendi and 
McKeiver, supra note 141, at 1120–21. 
160  See Feld, The Constitutional Tension Between Apprendi and McKeiver, supra note 141, at 
1133–34. 
161  See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 499–500. 
162  See Feld, The Constitutional Tension Between Apprendi and McKeiver, supra note 141, at 
1195–222; see also Welch v. United States, 604 F.3d 408, 432 (7th Cir. 2010); Gonzales v. 
Tafoya, 515 F.3d 1097, 1111 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Because juvenile waiver is a form of sentenc-
ing decision that represents a choice between the punitive sentences in criminal courts and the 
shorter, nominally rehabilitative dispositions available to juvenile courts, it increases the max-
imum penalties that juveniles face.” (quoting Feld, The Constitutional Tension Between Ap-
prendi and McKeiver, supra note 141, at 1216)); Jones v. Roberts, No. 06-3100-SAC, 2006 
WL 2989237, at *5 (D. Kan. Oct. 19, 2006) (“[T]he use of prior delinquency convictions to 
enhance adult sentences has a long lineage.” (quoting Feld, The Constitutional Tension Be-
tween Apprendi and McKeiver, supra note 141, at 1184)); In re Jonathon C.B., 958 N.E.2d 
227, 269 (Ill. 2011) (citing and quoting Feld, The Constitutional Tension Between Apprendi 
and McKeiver, supra note 141, at 1154, at length for questioning whether “McKeiver’s factual 
predicate—that the sanctions that juvenile courts impose are not ‘punishment’—has been su-
perseded by the new reality of juvenile justice . . . that changes in States’ juvenile codes have 
fostered a substantive, punitive convergence with criminal courts.”); State v. Bruegger, 773 
N.W.2d 862, 870–71 n.1 (Iowa 2009); State v. McFee, 721 N.W.2d 607, 612 (Minn. 2006) 
(citing Feld, The Constitutional Tension Between Apprendi and McKeiver, supra note 141, at 
1140–42, in “noting that similarities between criminal prosecutions and juvenile adjudications 
is what led Supreme Court to create procedural protections in Winship and Gault.”); State v. 
Brown, 879 So. 2d 1276, 1282 (La. 2004) (citing Feld, The Constitutional Tension Between 
Apprendi and McKeiver, supra note 141, at 1112, in discussing the Apprendi Court’s reason-
ing); State v. Hand, No. 25840, 2014 WL 4384121, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2014); People 
v. Nguyen, 54 Cal. Rptr. 3d 535, 547 n.7 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007); People v. Mazzoni, 165 P.3d 
719, 722 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006) (“[T]he use of prior delinquency convictions to enhance adult 
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McKeiver found non-jury delinquency conviction constitutionally adequate to 
impose rehabilitative dispositions,163 those convictions clearly would not be ad-
equate to inflict a punitive sentence in the first instance. 
The denial of a jury adversely affects rules of evidence, timing of suppres-
sion hearings, and appointment of counsel, and raises questions about the relia-
bility of convictions.164 In addition to direct penalties—institutional confinement 
and enhanced sentences as juveniles or as adults—extensive collateral conse-
quences follow from delinquency convictions. Although state policies vary, de-
linquency convictions may follow youths for decades and affect future housing, 
education, and employment opportunities.165 Upon arrest, states may enter juve-
niles’ fingerprints, photographs, and DNA into databases accessible to law en-
forcement and other agencies.166 Some states’ get tough reforms opened delin-
quency trials and juvenile records to the public. Media access to court 
proceedings, information available to the public, and print or televised reports on 
the Internet can create a permanent and easily accessible record of a youth’s de-
linquency. Even if not released to the public, criminal justice agencies, schools, 
childcare providers, the military, and others may have access to juvenile court 
records automatically or by petition to the court.167 Delinquency convictions may 
affect youths’ ability to obtain professional licensure, to receive government aid, 
to join the military, to obtain or keep legal immigration status, or to live in public 
housing.168 Youths applying to college must acknowledge arrests, suspensions, 
or expulsion, which may adversely affect their admission, and delinquency ad-
judications may make them ineligible for scholarships or federal grants.169 Juve-
niles convicted as adults suffer all the disabilities imposed on criminals; those 
found guilty of a felony may lose the right to serve on a jury or to vote even 
before they are eligible to register.170 The response to juvenile sex offenders is 
among the most onerous collateral consequences of delinquency adjudication.171 
In An American Travesty, Franklin Zimring argues that despite developmental 
differences between juveniles and adults, states’ sex offender laws assume that 
“adolescent and adult sexual behavior should be judged by the same standards of 
                                                        
sentences has a long lineage.” (quoting Feld, The Constitutional Tension Between Apprendi 
and McKeiver, supra note 141, at 1184)). 
163  See generally McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). 
164  See generally Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice, supra note 1, at 229–43. 
165  See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 133, at 3; ASHLEY NELLIS, 
A RETURN TO JUSTICE 61–63 (2016). 
166  FELD, JUVENILE JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION, supra note 53, at 369–76. 
167  NELLIS, supra note 165, at 63–65; James B. Jacobs, Juvenile Criminal Record Confidenti-
ality, in CHOOSING THE FUTURE FOR AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 149, 149–68 (Franklin E. 
Zimring & David S. Tanenhaus eds., 2014). 
168  NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 133, at 127; NELLIS, supra 
note 165, at 61–62. 
169  See NELLIS, supra note 165, at 62, 65–67. 
170  See id. at 61. 
171  See id. at 69–71. 
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culpability, clinical significance, and indications of future danger to the commu-
nity.”172 Applying laws created to punish adults who sexually exploit children to 
adolescents engaged in consensual underage sex, is an instance of “the feloniza-
tion of adolescent sex [] based on an invalid analogy with adult behavior.”173 
More recently, while writing about students’ Fourth Amendment search and 
seizure rights, I realized that the same punitive changes in juvenile justice poli-
cies occurred in schools and fuel the school-to-prison pipeline.174 Again, the 
Court used a different and lower standard to govern juveniles’ right to be free 
from unreasonable searches and seizures than it uses for adults. T.L.O. v. New 
Jersey authorized school officials to search students under a lower Fourth 
Amendment standard than that required to search adults—i.e., reasonable suspi-
cion rather than probable cause.175 As a result, evidence that would be inadmis-
sible against an adult in a criminal proceeding can be used to convict delinquents 
under the lower standard. Second, the presence of police in schools—School Re-
source Officers (“SROs”)—has increased greatly and they search students under 
the lower Fourth Amendment standard even when engaged in law enforcement 
activities.176 Schools rely increasingly on technology, metal detectors, and drug-
canines, and heightened surveillance, which increase the likelihood of finding 
wrongdoing.177 Third, schools adopted zero-tolerance policies for student devi-
ance with punitive and exclusionary consequences. In the wake of school shoot-
ings in the 1990s, Congress passed the Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994 and school 
officials adopted broader zero-tolerance policies toward criminal and school mis-
conduct.178 Finally, high-stakes testing regimes give schools financial incentives 
to rid themselves of under-performing students. This confluence of laws and pol-
icies has fueled the school-to-prison pipeline with a disparate impact on urban 
minority youths, which reinforces disproportionate minority confinement in the 
juvenile justice system. 
                                                        
172  FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AN AMERICAN TRAVESTY 14 (2004). 
173  Id. at 125. 
174  See generally Barry C. Feld, T.L.O. and Redding’s Unanswered (Misanswered) Fourth 
Amendment Questions: Few Rights and Fewer Remedies, 80 MISS. L.J. 847 (2011) [hereinafter 
Feld, Few Rights and Fewer Remedies], cited in State v. Lindsey, 881 N.W.2d 411, 428 (Iowa 
2016), In re T.A.S., 713 S.E.2d 211, 223 n.9 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011). 
175  See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985); Feld, Few Rights and Fewer Remedies, 
supra note 174, at 857–62. 
176  See Feld, Few Rights and Fewer Remedies, supra note 174, at 884–85. 
177  Id. at 884–85, 885 n.187. 
178  See Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 89-10, §§ 8921–23, 108 Stat. 3907. 
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CONCLUSION 
This is an opportune time to adopt more rational and humane juvenile justice 
policies.179 The dramatic drop in juvenile crime since the 1990s reduces its po-
litical salience. Continuing public support for delinquency prevention and treat-
ment belies politicians’ emphases on get tough policies. Advances in develop-
mental psychology and neuroscience heighten the understanding of children’s 
behavior and increase prospects to change it. The proliferation of sophisticated 
youth advocacy groups creates pressures on courts and legislatures to implement 
evidence-based and best-practices guidelines. Finally, states’ fiscal constraints 
make get tough policies a costly luxury. 
Despite these opportunities, I am dubious that real reforms will occur. Dur-
ing the Get Tough Era, political leaders and policy makers forgot that delinquents 
are children and differ from adults in competence and culpability. Juveniles are 
substantially less competent than adults to exercise or waive legal rights. States 
continue to use the adult waiver standards with which to measure juveniles and 
posit a functional equality that severely disadvantages most youths. These poli-
cies are especially problematic in a juvenile system that has become increasingly 
legalistic, complex, and punitive. The denial of a jury trial and collateral conse-
quences of delinquency convictions compound those inequities. 
Over the past few decades, states have transferred more and younger juve-
niles to criminal court for prosecution as adults. Get tough politicians’ sound 
bites—“adult crime, adult time” or “old enough to do the crime, old enough to 
do the time”—characterize youths as criminally responsible and advance policies 
that fail to recognize youthfulness as a mitigating factor in sentencing. The Court 
in Roper, Graham, and Miller finally called a halt to states’ most draconian ex-
cesses. It acknowledged that adolescents differ in qualities of judgment, self-
control, appreciation of consequences, and preferences for risks that diminish 
their responsibility and reduce their culpability. But states’ judicial and legisla-
tive responses to these decisions evince little concession to the mitigating quali-
ties of youth—e.g. a forty-year mandatory minimum term before eligibility for 
parole consideration and life without parole. 
The cumulative consequence of punitive policies inflicts the most severe 
adult sentences on black youths and disproportionately confines children of color 
in the juvenile justice system. For more than a century, juvenile courts have dis-
criminated between “our children” and “other people’s children.” Progressive 
reformers had to choose between initiating social structural reforms to alter con-
ditions that contribute to criminality—poverty, inequality, and discrimination—
or to apply band-aids to children damaged by those adverse circumstances. So-
cial class and ethnic antagonisms caused them to avoid broad structural changes 
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THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 898, 921 (Barry C. Feld 
& Donna M. Bishop eds., 2012). 
17 NEV.L.J. 299, FELD - FINAL.DOCX 4/5/17  11:01 AM 
Spring 2017] BARRY C. FELD—MY LIFE IN CRIME 329 
and instead to “save children.” A century later, we face the same policy choices 
and continue to evade our responsibilities to “other people’s children.” 
The prevalence of violent crime in certain urban areas is a reflection of 
power, politics, and social inequality. Concentrated poverty and racial isolation 
are the cumulative consequences of public policies that amplify crime and vio-
lence within inner-city minority communities—segregated areas of concentrated 
poverty. As long as the public and politicians identify long-term poverty and its 
associated problems—unemployment, drug abuse, criminality, and illegiti-
macy—as a condition of Blacks that is separate from the American mainstream, 
then policy makers can evade the government’s responsibility to address them. 
The political and public association of urban black males with crime has fostered 
punitive incarceration policies rather than efforts to expand employment and ed-
ucational opportunities to prevent crime. 
Although public policies and political economy contribute both to racial in-
equality and the skewed distribution of crime, politicians manipulate and exploit 
racially tinged perceptions of young offenders for electoral advantage. The trans-
formation of the juvenile court into an explicitly punitive agency to control 
“other people’s children” is an instance of politicians’ exploiting the connection 
between race and youth crime. Politicians and the public view juvenile courts’ 
clients as young criminals of color and refuse to commit resources necessary to 
improve their life conditions or to create a juvenile system that provides real 
justice. 
The primary virtue of the juvenile court today is that it is not a criminal court. 
Although Progressive reformers proffered rehabilitation as the primary justifica-
tion for a separate juvenile court, diversion from the criminal process provided a 
second rationale at its inception and the court’s diversionary function still pre-
vails.180 Regardless of juvenile courts’ inability to rehabilitate children, simply 
deflecting youths from the criminal justice system avoids its more destructive 
consequences and shields them from life-altering punishment and collateral con-
sequences. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
180  See Zimring, The Common Thread, supra note 12, at 2487. 
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